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When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed in
Securities Class Actions?
By Roberta S. Karmel*
Reasonable orjustifiable reliance is one of the elements of a claim by a private party under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('Exchange Act"). Section 18 of the Ex-
change Act has an even stricter reliance requirement, but proof of reliance is not required for a
claim under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. This Article will discuss the basis for these
discrepancies and inquire into whether traditional interpretations of the reliance requirement
need to be re-examined. There are at least two possible reasons for such re-examination. First,
the reliance requirement isfrequently presumed in securities class actions based on the efficient
capital market hypothesis C'ECMH"), but the ECMH has come to be seriously questioned in
the academic literature. Second, high-powered decision makers in several recent reports have
asserted that U.S. capital markets are becoming less competitive than overseas markets due, in
part, to the high level of civil liability under the federal securities laws. These decision makers
recommend that the uncertainties as to the elements of liability under Rule I Ob-5 be resolved.
Once such element, reliance, has become actively litigated with respect to the certification of
class actions, and the decisions in these cases are often critical to the outcome of the litigation.
This Article argues that in developing the law of civil liability under Rule 10b-5, the
courts should be guided by the doctrine that public companies impliedly represent that the
statements they make in U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")fllings and other
required public utterances are truthful, and accordingly, they should be liable when materi-
ally false or misleading statements are made that cause damage to investors, whether or
not investors can prove they read and relied upon such statements in purchasing or selling
securities. Nevertheless, a plaintiff should be required to prove that such presumed reliance
was reasonable. Such a theory of constructive reliance could be achieved through a reinter-
pretation of section 18 of the Exchange Act, through presumptions concerning reliance in
Rule I Ob-5 cases, or through legislation or possibly rulemaking by the SEC.
This Article will discuss the common law action for deceit, its inapplicability to issuer fraud in
modern securities markets, and the defects of section 18 of the Exchange Act as a substitute for the
common law. The development of Rule 1Ob-5 actions as an alternative cause of action and the re-
quirements for reliance in Rule lob-5 cases will also be covered. This Article then will discuss the
ECMH, the theories of its supporters and detractors, as well as its use by the SEC in formulating
securities disclosure policy. Finally, a revisionist view will be presented of how thefraud-on-the-
market doctrine should be used in connection with proof of reliance in securities litigation.
* Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Dennis J. Block Center
for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. She gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance of Thomas Schiera. A research stipend from Brooklyn Law School was of assistance
in the preparation of this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Reasonable or justifiable reliance is one of the elements of a claim by a private
party under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act").' This provision is a general anti-fraud prohibition giving rise to suits by
any person for false or misleading statements in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities. The requirement of reasonable reliance by an investor on mis-
statements or omissions is derived from the common law, and is also required
in the express civil liability provision in section 18 of the Exchange Act. 2 But
proof of reliance is not required for a claim pursuant to section 11 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), 3 which provides an action for rescission to
purchasers in an underwriting of securities. Also, the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") is not required to prove reliance in cases it
brings.4
This Article will discuss the basis for these discrepancies and inquire into whether
traditional interpretations of the reliance requirement need to be re-examined.
There are at least two possible reasons for such a re-examination at this time. First,
the reliance requirement is frequently presumed in securities class actions based
on the efficient capital market hypothesis ("ECMH"), but the ECMH has come to
be seriously questioned in the academic literature.' Nevertheless, since the SEC's
integrated disclosure regime for public companies also is based, at least in part, on
the ECMH, any re-interpretation of the reliance requirement needs to be consonant
1. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange-... To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881,891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (2000)) [hereinafter "Exchange Act"].
2. Section 18 provides:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application, report, or
document filed pursuant to [the Exchange Act] or any rule or regulation thereunder .. which
statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such
statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased
or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such
reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge
that such statement was false or misleading.
Exchange Act, supra note 1, § 18, 84 Stat. at 897 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(2000)).
3. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 11, 48 Star. 74, 82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(2000)) [hereinafter "Securities Act"].
4. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part Ill.
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with the SECs integrated disclosure regulations and policies. Second, high-powered
decision makers have asserted in several recent reports that the U.S. capital markets
are becoming less competitive than overseas markets due, in part, to the high level
of civil liability under the federal securities laws.6 These report authors recommend
that the uncertainties as to the elements of liability under Rule 10b-5 be resolved.7
One such element is reliance, because the issue of reliance in the certification of
class actions has become an actively litigated area and the decisions in these cases
are often crucial to the outcome of the litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court is likely
to address the reliance issue in connection with securities class action certifications
in the near future, and such a decision could affect the future of securities class
actions under section 10(b). 8
A threshold question as to whether a case can proceed as a class action is
whether reliance by the class can be presumed or reliance must be proven by in-
dividual plaintiffs or groups. I argue that reliance should be presumed when mate-
rially false or misleading statements are made by an issuer in a document required
to be filed with the SEC, but that such a presumption of reliance should not end
the inquiry as to whether such reliance was reasonable. But the presumption of
reliance should not be accorded to statements by third parties who do not owe a
duty to public investors or shareholders. A number of courts are already headed
in the direction of creating more stringent standards for the reliance requirement
in section 10(b) cases,9 but this development is often criticized, as being inimical
to investors. 1
This criticism takes too narrow a view of investor and public policy concerns.
In section 10(b) cases, there are two sets of investor interests at stake-the
interests of purchasers of an issuer's securities in the public securities mar-
kets, and the interests of existing shareholders. Similarly there are opposing
shareholder interests at the time of a section 10(b) lawsuit-the interests of
investors who no longer hold the issuer's securities and the shareholders during
the pendency of the lawsuit. Further, third party public company defendants
who do not clearly owe a duty to public investors may owe a duty to their own
shareholders. A reinterpretation of the reliance requirement could effect a better
6. See THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL
MARKETS REGULATION 5 (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/I .30Committee-
InterimReportREV2.pdf [hereinafter "CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION"I; MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES
E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GI.ORAI- FINANCIAl. SERVICES LEADERSHIP 101 (Jan.
2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special-reports/
2007/NYREPORT%20_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter "BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER"I. See also U.S. CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORTS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (March 2007), available at http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/
0703capmarketscomm.
7. See CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 6, at 80-82; BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 6,
at 100-04.
8. See infra notes 161-62.
9. See infra Part IV
10. See, e.g., Editorial, Holding Accomplices Accountable, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2007, at 11.
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balance of these disparate interests. In addition, it should be recognized that
the securities class action is a cumbersome and very expensive mechanism for
obtaining recourse for investors where there has been issuer fraud. The real
party in interest in these cases frequently is the plaintiffs' attorney who obtains
25-35% of the recovery." Consideration of the "public interest" is stated as
an alternative to "the protection of investors" in section 10(b).' 2 The national
economic interest may sometimes outweigh the special economic interest of a
subset of investors.
When Congress enacted the Exchange Act, it established civil liability for false
or misleading statements in any document filed pursuant to the Exchange Act for
any person who, in reliance upon any such statement, purchased or sold a secu-
rity at a price affected by the statement. " Before the advent of the Internet and the
SEC's EDGAR system, it was difficult for investors to access documents filed with
the SEC. It was also difficult for plaintiffs to prove reliance on information in filed
documents. Accordingly, section 18 was rarely used as a basis for a lawsuit. 14 By
contrast, section 11 of the Securities Act which provides for civil liability for false
or misleading statements in a prospectus used in a registered securities offering
does not require proof of reliance.1
5
In order to obtain recourse for fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, other than in a registered public offering, plaintiffs persuaded federal
judges to imply a claim for liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 16 and
Rule lOb-5 thereunder.'7 These provisions broadly prohibit the making of false or
misleading statements but do not otherwise specify the elements of a fraud claim.
Since claims under section 10(b) were implied by the courts, the courts were re-
quired to fill in the contours of this statutory tort, which became widely used not
only by individual investors, but also by plaintiffs in securities class actions.
11. See CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 6, at 11.
12. See Exchange Act, supra note 1, § 10(b), 48 Stat. at 891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (2000)).
13. Id.
14. According to Professors Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, the restrictive language and interpreta-
tions of section 18 gave plaintiffs suing pursuant to this section no advantage over those suing pursu-
ant to a common law action for deceit. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 1 1-C-3(c)
(3d ed. 1995).
15. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 E2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967).
16. Exchange Act, supra note 1, § 10(b), 48 Stat. at 891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(2000)).
17. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumental-
ity of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
17 C.FR. § 240.10b-5 (2007). See also Thomas E McInerney Il, Habermas, Proceduralism and the
Private Cause of Action Under Rule 1Ob-5: The Implications for Democracy, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 805,
806-29 (1998).
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Rule 10b-5 was enacted by the SEC in a somewhat casual manner in 1942 in
order to capture fraud by buyers, as well as sellers, of securities. ' Four years later,
a court found an implied private right of action in section 10(b) utilizing a statu-
tory tort theory to interpret congressional intent.19 The Supreme Court did not
uphold such a claim for several decades, but by the early 1970s such a claim was
well established.
20
In the first three decades of interpretations under section 10(b), the courts ex-
panded the types of cases that could be brought under this section, but beginning
in 1975, the Supreme Court began a retrenchment. 2' Since then, the Supreme
Court's development of the law under section 10(b) has not been consistent. Some
courts have reaffirmed expansive readings of the anti-fraud provisions,22 some have
enlarged the actions cognizable under section 10(b), 23 and some have curtailed
the types of cases that can be prosecuted. 24 Congress has left the development of
the substantive law of Rule lob-5 cases to the courts, although it has tinkered
with remedies, making the punishment for insider trading cases more severe in
the 1980s,25 and making it more difficult to prosecute securities class actions in
the 1990s.
26
18. Milton Freeman, the staffer who drafted the rule, recounted its origins in Conference on Codifica-
tion of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967).
19. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
20. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); see also
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
21. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-47 (1975). See also Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F2d 534, 541 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S.
375 (1983).
22. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650-66 (1997) (holding that partner in law
firm that represented a company in a tender offer for common shares of another company was crimi-
nally liable for misappropriation when he purchased call options in the target company and then sold
them for a substantial profit).
23. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286, 297 (1993) (holding that
insurer had a right to contribution from accountants and attorneys involved in misleading public of-
fering); Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 594-97 (2001) (holding
that an option consisting of an oral contract was enforceable, and defendant's failure to disclose its
intention not to honor the option upon forming the contract amounted to actionable fraud); SEC v.
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-25 (2002) (holding that stockbroker's sale of customer's securities and
personal use of the proceeds without the customer's knowledge or consent constituted fraud "in con-
nection with" the sale of a security and was therefore actionable).
24. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198-99 (1976) (holding that negligence
cannot be the basis for an action under Rule 10b-5 and the plaintiff must allege and prove scienter);
Chiarella v. Unitcd States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980) (holding that employee of a financial printer
was not liable under Rule 10b-5 because he did not violate any fiduciary duty by identifying takeover
targets from unpublished corporate announcements and purchasing shares in the targets which he would
then sell for large profits); Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 175-77
(1994) (holding that a private action for aiding and abetting a fraud is not actionable under Rule 10b-5).
25. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No.100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
26. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "PSLRA"l; Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "SLUSA"I.
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In trying to define the parameters of a section 10(b) case, the courts have looked
to the elements of the common law action for deceit. Recently, the Court has
stated that a judicially implied Rule 10b-5 claim "resembles, but is not identical
to, common-law tort actions for deceit and misrepresentation."27 Looking to the
common law has not necessarily been a helpful referent since the federal securities
laws were passed because common law remedies for fraud on investors were inad-
equate in modern anonymous securities markets.2 8 The use of the securities class
action to vindicate Rule 1Ob-5 claims in an anonymous public securities market is
a far different vehicle than the classic action for deceit by a buyer against a seller of
securities or other goods. Further, the Supreme Court has interpreted Rule lOb-5
by "old tort law" cases rather than "modem tort law scholarship."29
Another problem is that there is no overriding theory as to what section 10(b)
cases are supposed to accomplish other than the vague goals of fostering the pub-
lic interest or protecting investors, goals which elude measurement. On the one
hand, giving section 10(b) an expansive interpretation in securities class actions
assists investors in the public securities markets injured by an issuer's fraud be-
cause they purchased or sold securities based on fraudulent information. On the
other hand, the funds collected in such an action come from the issuer and po-
tentially injure the issuer's shareholders, particularly long-term shareholders who
held at the time of the issuer's false or misleading statements. But opponents of the
existing securities litigation system have equally vague and unsatisfactory goals
like curbing abusive class actions.30 In recent years, the courts have confronted
both the salutary and unsavory aspects of securities class actions by focusing on
the elements of reliance and causation in securities anti-fraud cases, and testing
them according to the ECMH. The result has not been coherent, in part because
developments have not been based on any clearly articulated policy
The ECMH is a theory of financial economics describing the relationship be-
tween financial disclosure and securities prices which has had a profound effect
on academic literature, rule making by the SEC, and judicial decision making.3'
27. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). Looking to tort law to interpret Ex-
change Act fraud is not new. In Moody v. Bache & Co., Inc., 570 F2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1978), the court
observed that Rule 10b-5 is "essentially a tort claim."
28. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.22 (1988) (plurality opinion). Not all justices have
agreed with this rationale. See, e.g., Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1110 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part).
29. Robert B. Thompson, Federal Corporate Law: Torts and Fiduciary Duty, 31 J. CoRP. L. 877, 887
(2006).
30. Compare Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARv. L. REV. 727, 742-43 (1995) (argu-
ing that a substantial percentage of settlements of private matters are merely an effort to avoid litiga-
tion costs and that therefore the SEC must act to make meritless claims more difficult to pursue),
with Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights
of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority," 108 HAizv. L. REV. 438, 448-57
(1994) (arguing against limits on private rights of action because courts are equipped to weed out non-
meritorious claims, settled claims often have more merit than studies suggest, and private rights of action
provide an important police function). See also Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991); but see generally James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud
Class Actions Virtuous, 39 Amiz. L. REv. 497 (1997) (arguing for the continuation of securities class actions).
31. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv.
549, 549-50 (1984).
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The "weak" version of the ECMH asserts that securities prices are determined by
currently available information rather than historical trends.3 2 The "semi-strong"
version of the theory asserts that securities prices reflect all publicly available in-
formation.3 3 The "strong" version of the ECMH asserts that securities prices reflect
all information, whether publicly available or not.34 The ECMH has been utilized
to raise a presumption of reliance for plaintiffs in securities class actions under the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine. This Article will discuss the ECMH and its use in
determining whether the elements of reliance and transaction causation have been
satisfied in section 10(b) cases against issuers and their officers and directors, and
also in cases against third parties such as research analysts and banks. 35
I argue that in developing the law of civil liability under Rule lOb-5, the courts
should be guided by the doctrine that public companies impliedly represent that
the statements they make in SEC filings and other required public utterances are
truthful, and accordingly, they should be liable when materially false or mislead-
ing statements are made that cause damage to investors, whether or not investors
can prove they read and relied upon such statements in purchasing or selling se-
curities. Nevertheless, a plaintiff should be required to prove that such presumed
reliance was reasonable. Such a theory of constructive reliance could be achieved
through a reinterpretation of section 18 of the Exchange Act or through presump-
tions concerning reliance in Rule lOb-5 cases, or through legislation or possibly
rule making by the SEC. Since 1980, the SEC has worked toward an integration of
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, and since 2002, the SEC staff has focused
on the importance of annual and periodic reports filed pursuant to the Exchange
Act as these have become the building blocks for integrated disclosure. Neverthe-
less, the civil liability provisions for false or misleading statements in prospectuses
and other documents filed with the SEC or publicly circulated by issuers have not
been reconciled or integrated. The use of the ECMH by the courts has helped to
bridge the gap in theories of appropriate liability for issuer false and misleading
statements under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, but current cases in
which courts question the viability of the ECMH may change the law.
Part II of this Article will discuss the common law action for deceit, its inap-
plicability to issuer fraud in modern securities markets, and the defects of section
18 of the Exchange Act as a substitute for an action for deceit. The development of
Rule 10b-5 actions as an alternative remedy and the requirements for reliance in
these cases will also be covered. Part Ill will discuss the ECMH, and the theories of
32. See Eugene E Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of the Theory and Empirical Work, 25
J. FIN. 383, 388 (1970).
33. Id.
34. Id. The "weak" version of the ECMH commands nearly universal acceptance; the "semi-strong"
version is generally accepted; and the "strong" version is controversial because it assumes the existence
of insider trading. Even if the markets are efficient in any of these ways, stock market prices do not
necessarily reflect accurate estimates of a security's intrinsic value. See JAMEs D. COX Er AL., SECURITIES
REGUwATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 106-08 (5th ed. 2006).
35. Although section 10(b) encompasses other varieties of fraud, such as insider trading, the focus
of this Article will be on false or misleading statements by issuers and cases against research analysts
and other third parties.
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its supporters and detractors, as well as its use by the SEC for formulating securi-
ties disclosure policy Part IV will discuss recent cases questioning the ECMH as a
tool for presuming reliance by an investor class and in cases against third parties.
Part V will set forth a revisionist view of how the fraud-on-the-market doctrine
should be used in connection with proof of reliance in securities litigation.
II. SECTION 18 OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SECTION 10(B) AS A STATUTORY TORT
A. THE ELEMENTS OF A COMMON LAW DECEIT ACTION
The tort of deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation is of ancient origin.3" It can
be argued that the prohibition against business fraud goes back to the principle
of lifnei iver in the Old Testament that "[y] ou shall not ... place a stumbling block
before the blind."37 This has been interpreted as a prohibition against giving bad
advice to another person, especially when the advisor has an ulterior motive. 31
It further is a prohibition against helping or causing another to sin. Therefore,
accountants and auditors who negligently issue financial statements and mislead
others, such as investors or creditors, are guilty of lifnei iver.39
The common law tort of deceit is generally traced to Pasley v. Freeman,40 in
which the court divorced liability for fraudulent misrepresentation from contrac-
tual relationships. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the elements of
the common law action for deceit are as follows: "[olne who fraudulently makes
a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing
another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability
to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation."4' A simpler, alternative formulation is that at com-
mon law, the tort of deceit required "a misstatement of a material fact, made with
scienter, on which the plaintiff relied, causing damages as a result.' 42 This defini-
tion makes explicit that fraud requires knowing or reckless misconduct, a require-
ment that was embodied in the common law 43 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,l the
Supreme Court interpreted the words "manipulative," "device" and "contrivance"
in Rule lOb-5 to similarly require scienter.
The required elements of materiality, reliance, and causation can easily be,
and frequently are, confused. One commenter has observed that reliance is a
36. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 549 (1999).
37. Leviticus 19:14.
38. Hershey H. Friedman, Placing a Stumbling Block Before the Blind Person: An In-Depth Analysis
(2002), http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/placingstumbling.html.
39. Id.
40. (1789) 100 E.R. 450, 452, 457-58 (K.B.).
41. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TosS § 525 (1977).
42. Thompson, supra note 29, at 879.
43. Derry v. Peek, (1889) 37 App. Cas. 337, 374 (HL.). Yet, more recently the common law has
developed the tort of negligent misrepresentation. See Epstein, supra note 36, at 568-74.
44. 425 U.S. 185, 198-99 (1976).
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corollary of materiality45 In part, this is because at common law the plaintiff's
reliance had to be "justifiable" and this was shown by proof that the misrep-
resentation was material. 46 Further, causation was shown by proof that the
plaintiff relied on the defendant's statements to his or her detriment.47 What is
frequently considered "transaction causation" is in fact a variant of the reliance
requirement.
48
Whether a plaintiff has demonstrated reliance at common law can turn on
whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation that the plaintiff would rely
upon the misrepresentation in question. For example, in a Massachusetts case in
which shareholders sued an accounting firm for fraudulent misrepresentation in
connection with an audit opinion, the court held that the plaintiffs did not have to
show that the accounting firm's misrepresentations were made with the purpose
of inducing reliance; rather, they could show that the firm had reason to expect
that shareholders would rely on its audited statements. 49 By contrast, in a Texas
case in which an institutional investor sued an accounting firm for fraudulent
misrepresentation for confirming the financial strength of a bank in a merger, the
court held that the defendant was not liable because it had no reason to expect the
plaintiff to rely on its audit report in deciding to buy notes.5 0
B. LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 18
Section 18 of the Exchange Act is in some ways as rigorous as, or even more
rigorous than, the common law action for deceit, although in other ways it is more
relaxed. Scienter is not required. 51 But both transaction causation and loss causation
are required. 2 More relevant to this Article, there is a strict reliance requirement.
The party seeking recovery must demonstrate that the plaintiff had actual knowl-
edge of and relied upon specific misstatements in one or more documents filed
45. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 499 (5th ed. 2005). In a recent case, the
judge remarked that "transaction causation is akin to reliance." In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 465
F Supp. 2d 34, 51 (D. Mass. 2006).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2) (1977).
47. Id. § 537.
48. See Currie v. Cayman Res. Corp., 835 E2d 780, 785 (11th Cir. 1988).
49. Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 787 N.E.2d 1060, 1066-68 (Mass. App. Ct.), review
denied, 787 N.E.2d 1060 (Mass. 2003) (unpublishcd table decision).
50. Ernst & Young L.L.P v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W3d 573, 579-82 (Tex. 2001).
51. In this respect it is easier to prosecute a case under section 18 than under section 10(b).
See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 650 E2d 343, 356-58 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (noting that fraud is required for a section 10(b) claim), cert. denied sub nor. White &
Case v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc.,
607 E2d 545, 556 (2d Cir. 1979) ("A plaintiff seeking recovery under [§1 18 faces a significantly
lighter burden" than a plaintiff seeking recovery under § 10), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
52. Theresa A. Gabaldon, Causation, Courts, and Congress: A Study of Contradiction in the Federal
Securities Laws, 31 B.C. L. REv. 1027, 1038, 1060-64 (1990).
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with the SEC containing the false or misleading statement at issue.53 Constructive
or presumed reliance is insufficient; "eyeball" reliance is necessary
5 4
Because of this reliance requirement, section 18 has proved to be a completely
ineffective remedy for recovering losses caused by issuer misstatements or mis-
leading omissions, even when such statements have been made to the SEC in
documents required to be filed pursuant to the federal securities laws. By contrast,
in some common law cases, and cases under federal statutes other than the federal
securities laws, the reliance requirement for deceit or fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions has been relaxed where misrepresentations are made to a regulator.
For example, plaintiffs injured by bone screws implanted in their spines al-
leged that the manufacturer made misrepresentations to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") when it sought to obtain approval to market the bone
screw device. The court held both that the lower court was in error in deter-
mining the plaintiffs could not establish causation, and that reliance might not
be required to be proven because there was indirect reliance on the statements
made to the FDA. 5 Courts also have held that a company's misrepresentation to
a regulator can give rise to a class action claim under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO") by consumers injured by the regulator's
reliance on the false statements. Such a theory was utilized in a case involving
the presentation of fraudulent accounting statements, which overstated expenses
and understated income by reason of improper expensing methods, in connec-
tion with a public service commission rate making proceeding.5 6 A class action
by purchasers of electricity was initially allowed to go forward under the theory
that defendants violated the mail fraud statute in the utility rate making proceed-
ings because plaintiffs satisfied the predicate for a RICO violation in alleging a
loss of money-a tangible, cognizable injury 7 In another RICO case the Court
53. See In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 E3d 256, 283-84 (3d Cir. 2006); Ross, 607
F2d at 552; Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
54. Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F Supp. 518, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Fraud-on-
the-market reliance is unavailable. See In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 E Supp. 785, 798 (S.D. Cal.
1990).
55. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Liab. Litig., 159 F3d 817, 826-29 (3d Cir. 1998), rev'd sub nom.
on other grounds, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
56. Taffet v. S. Co., 930 F2d 847 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated & reh'g granted, 958 E2d 1514 (11th
Cir. 1992). This theory was utilized in Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F3d 356, 369 (4th Cir.
2004), in a section 10(b) case, and succeeded in the district court, but was reversed on appeal on
the ground that the lower court needed to address on remand whether the defendant "made a public
misrepresentation for which it may be found primarily liable." For a discussion of aiding and abetting
liability, see infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
57. Taffet, 930 E2d at 856-57. The court in Taffet, 930 F2d at 857, reversed the district court and
found that the plaintiffs alleged a cognizable claim under RICO. On rehearing, the court of appeals
decided that the filed rate doctrine precluded plaintiffs' claim and upheld the district court. Taffet v. S.
Co., 967 F2d 1483, 1494 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992). For another case in which
plaintiffs alleged a fraudulent misrepresentation as the basis for a RICO claim, see Suffolk v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 907 F2d 1295, 1305-08, 1311-12 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that fraudulent mis-
representation regarding building of Shoreham nuclear plant by state-regulated utility could be the
basis for a RICO claim, but affirming judgment notwithstanding the verdict entered by the trial court
because there was not enough of a causal connection between the fraud and plaintiffs' alleged injury).
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suggested in dictum that "parking transactions" by a broker-dealer resulting in a
false net capital statement to regulators could be the predicate for a mail fraud,
wire fraud, or "fraud in the sale of securities claim" on behalf of customers of
the broker-dealer proximately injured by these stock manipulations and false net
capital computations. 8
The very narrow interpretations of section 18 by the courts have so vitiated
the usefulness of that provision that there have been no recoveries under this
section. 9 The language of section 18 would not necessarily preclude the use of
the indirect reliance theory espoused in these non-securities cases to grant recov-
ery to investors injured by an issuer's false or misleading statements in filed SEC
documents, but the rigidly narrow interpretation of the reliance requirement by
the courts has precluded the use of such a theory. Further, section 18 could also
be reinterpreted by using the ECMH to assert that investors are entitled to expect
that the market price of a security is set without being affected by materially false
or misleading statements emanating from the issuer. Under such a reinterpreta-
tion, investors would need not prove they "eyeballed" the false or misleading
statements at issue.'
One of the barriers to a revisionist interpretation of section 18 is that there is
legislative history suggesting that an express reliance requirement was inserted
into the statute after criticism that an earlier version of section 18 would have al-
lowed recovery to any plaintiff who could show that stock purchased or sold was
affected by a false or misleading statement in a filed document. 6' Nevertheless, the
cases that permit recovery to plaintiffs for indirect reliance outside of the section
18 context are consonant with the idea expressed in section 18 that companies
should be liable for false or misleading statements in SEC filed documents.
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY UNDER RULE 1OB-5
From 1946, when an implied right of action was recognized in a Rule lob-5 case,
until 1975, the Supreme Court accepted few securities law cases. In 1971, the Court
recognized this implied right of action in a footnote, with virtually no discussion.
62
By then, the lower courts had developed a robust body of Rule 10b-5 case law. In
1975, the Court referred to this case law as "a judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn. '63 Despite some attempts by the Burger Court to
curtail the further growth of this oak tree, and efforts by Congress to curtail securi-
ties class actions, Rule 10b-5 cases have become a veritable forest. Two doctrines of
relevance to this Article were of particular importance in encouraging this growth.
58. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 272 n.19 (1992).
59. See Gabaldon, supra note 52, at 1061.
60. Marc I. Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 557, 598-600 (1982).
61. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 257-58 (White,J., dissenting). It is ironic that this change was prompted
by testimony by Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock Exchange, later indicted for
embezzlement.
62. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
63. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
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In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,64 the court held that an issuer did not need to
purchase or sell securities in order to be liable for false or misleading statements
under Rule 1Ob-5. Although this case was an action by the SEC and not a private
action, subsequent courts did not distinguish between government and private
actions for damages. In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,65 the Court held that
a Rule 10b-5 action could be prosecuted by a private plaintiff even though Rule
10b-5 overlapped with the remedy provided by section 11 of the Securities Act.
These holdings opened the door for a flood of litigation under Rule 10b-5, many
of them class actions. Although Congress attempted to partially close that door
in the 1990s by establishing stricter pleading requirements for securities class ac-
tions and pre-empting securities class actions in the state courts,6 6 the scandals in
the securities markets in the wake of the 2000-2001 market collapse led to nu-
merous class action cases under the anti-fraud provisions against both established
issuers and smaller, newer public companies. Success in prosecuting these cases
depended, among other things, on the ability of plaintiffs to establish the reliance
and causation requirements imported into Rule 10b-5 doctrine from tort law.
6 7
Proving reliance in class actions is virtually impossible since separate trials
could be necessary in order to resolve whether reliance existed for each transac-
tion that occurred in a public securities market. 6 Similarly, proving reliance in the
case of nondisclosure is problematic at best, because of the difficulty of proving
a negative. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,69 the Court held that in face-
to-face transactions between a seller and buyer of securities, reliance can be pre-
sumed from the materiality of the facts omitted from disclosure. This holding was
thereafter interpreted by lower courts as applying only in "pure" omission cases,
as opposed to cases where there were both misrepresentations and omissions.7"
Then, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,7 the Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-the-
market theory as a basis for permitting a presumption of reliance in misrepre-
sentation cases arising from securities traded on public markets. In a plurality
decision, Justice Blackman based the holding that reliance could be presumed in a
64. 401 F2d 833, 860-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
65. 459 U.S. 375, 382-87 (1983).
66. See PSLRA, supra note 26, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.);
SLUSA, supra note 26, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
67. In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-43 (2005), the Court set forth the
elements of a Rule lob-5 case as follows: 1) a material misstatement or omission; 2) made with scienter; 3)
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; 4) on which the plaintiff relied (referred to as
"transaction causation" in fraud-on-the-market cases); 5) economic loss; and 6) "loss causation," or a
causal connection between the material misrepresentation or omission and the loss.
68. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 E2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
Courts therefore have recognized that proof of direct reliance by class members would be an unreason-
able burden. See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 E3d 165, 178 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub noma.
Forbes v. Semerenko, 531 U.S. 1149 (2001).
69. 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
70. See Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F3d 1059, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Binder v.
Wilson, 528 U.S. 1154 (2000). Even in face-to-face transactions courts declined to utilize the pre-
sumption of reliance in a misrepresentation case. See Feinman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 84 E3d
539, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1996).
71. 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1988) (plurality opinion).
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class action under Rule 10b-5 on the ECMH to the effect that, in an open and de-
veloped securities market, the prices of a company's securities are determined by
publicly available material information regarding the company and its business.72
In modem public securities markets, which have replaced face-to-face transactions
between a buyer and a seller of securities, the market is performing a valuation
function that transmits information to investors generally Justice Blackman ar-
gued that presumptions arise out of considerations of "fairness, public policy, and
probability, as well as judicial economy," and therefore are "useful devices for al-
locating the burdens of proof between parties." 73 This presumption of reliance is
known as the fraud-on-the-market theory.7 " The issuer misstatements in Basic did
not involve information in SEC filed documents, but rather, public denials that
the issuer was engaged in merger negotiations. 5
Justice Bryon White, in a dissent in Basic, argued that the fraud-on-the-market
theory "suggests that stocks have some 'true value' that is measurable by a stan-
dard other than their market price. '76 But, he asserted, investors sometimes be-
lieve that the stock market prices inaccurately reflect the true value of a security,
and this is their motivation for buying or selling a stock.77 This dissent seems to
miss the point of the fraud-on-the-market theory, which is that reliance on the
integrity of the market price is substituted for reliance on the challenged disclo-
sure.78 As explained in a subsequent district court case,79 the average investor
does not personally need access to the elaborate financial disclosure mandated by
the SEC because this information is sifted through financial intermediaries whose
trading establishes market prices. The court stated:
The fraud on the market theory thus shifts the inquiry from whether an individual
investor was fooled to whether the market as a whole was fooled. Hence, the theory
not so much eliminates the reliance requirement as subsumes it in the fraud-on-the-
market analysis. In the same way, the theory also subsumes the inquiry into material-
ity, causation and damages. For if a misleading or fraudulent disclosure or omission
could have had no effect on the security's market price, the information cannot have
been material. Similarly, if a misstatement or omission had no effect on the market
price (because, for example, the market already had the correct information from
other sources) then there could be no causation and no damages.80
After Affiliated Ute and Basic, a presumption of reliance was available to plain-
tiffs in most Rule 10-5 class actions. Yet, in pure omission cases, as opposed to
72. Id.
73. Id. at 245.
74. Id. This holding was presaged in Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F2d 891, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976), and Peil v. Speiser, 806 F2d 1154, 1160-63 (3d Cir. 1986).
75. Basic, 485 U.S. at 227-28.
76. Id. at 255 (White, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 256.
78. See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 907, 908 (1989).
79. In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 784 F Supp. 1471, 1479 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, 11 E3d 865 (9th
Cir. 1993).
80. Id. at 1479.
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misleading statement cases, if the issuer had no duty to speak, there should be no
presumption of reliance. Also, a presumption of reliance does not end all inquiry
as to whether reliance was reasonable. In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,81 the
Court held that a plaintiff in a securities fraud case must prove that the defendant
made a materially false statement or omitted to state a material fact, the plaintiff
would not have bought shares absent the misrepresentation or omission, and that the
material misrepresentation or omission caused plaintiff's injury. Both loss causa-
tion and transaction causation must be proven.82 Loss causation requires proof of
economic harm; transaction causation requires proof that the defendant's viola-
tions caused the plaintiff to engage in the transactions in question. Further, the
need to allege and prove causation is related to the efficiency of the market in a
security, since loss causation requires a market efficient enough so that the alleged
misrepresentation is incorporated into the stock price, artificially inflating or de-
flating it, and also requires that subsequent corrective statements dissipate such
pricing corruption. These causation requirements also are related to the material-
ity element of a Rule 10b-5 case because if a false or misleading statement is not
material it should not move the market in a security
A common example of an issuer's false statement which may not be material is a
financial restatement. In recent years thousands of companies have issued restated
financials, often in response to a changed SEC accounting interpretation,83 and a
securities class action has often quickly followed. But with financial restatements
becoming such a commonplace occurrence, are they necessarily material for pur-
poses of Rule 10b-5? Does it make sense to have a system where over 5,000 com-
panies and their shareholders and accountants in the course of a decade become
subject to the liability of a securities class action suit due to financial restatements?
While the number of restatements suggests a problem with the U.S. financial
reporting system, class action lawsuits do not seem the appropriate mechanism
for dealing with the problem. This issue can be tested by a causation analysis in a
section 10(b) suit, but it can also be tested from an inquiry as to whether investor
reliance was reasonable. Changes in SEC accounting interpretations resulting in
accounting restatements should be within an investor's reasonable expectations.
Another example of corporate developments where the reasonableness of in-
vestor reliance should be critically examined is the announcement of regulatory
action by an administrative agency Most public corporations are subject to a vari-
ety of regulatory regimes, and depending upon the corporation's business, certain
81. Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 341-46.
82. Id. at 342-46.
83. The number of accounting restatements between 1990 and 1997 averaged 49 annually See
Steve Liesman, Deciphering the Black Box: Many Accounting Practices, Not Just Enron's, Are Hard To Pen-
etrate, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2003, at Cl. However, between 1997 and 2005, U.S. public companies
filed 3,642 restatements to correct accounting inaccuracies. See Lynn E. Turner & Thomas R. Weirich,
A Closer Look at Financial Statement Restatments, CPA J., Dec. 1, 2006, at 3. In 2006, U.S. companies
issued a record of 1,420 financial restatements, although large companies issued fewer restatements
than in 2005. See Steven Marcy, Total Financial Restatements Increase in 2006, but Declinefor Large Enti-
ties, 39 SEC. REo. & L. REP. (BNA) 366 (Mar. 5, 2007).
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regulators are especially important, e.g., the FDA for a pharmaceutical company
Is it reasonable for an investor to believe that such a company will never be subject
to a product disapproval or recall or other action by the FDA when such actions
are a common occurrence?84 If a company has made false statements in an SEC fil-
ing about the prospects of FDA action, then it may be appropriate for a securities
class action to be instituted based on the untruth of such statements. But many
courts utilize the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance in omission cases that do
not arise from face-to-face transactions,85 and then, the reasonableness of reliance
on what has not been disclosed should be seriously examined.
Although federal courts have generally utilized the fraud-on-the-market theory
since Basic, this theory has not found favor in state courts, even in states where
indirect reliance is permitted for negligent misrepresentation.86 The attitude of the
state court judges seems to be that the fraud-on-the-market theory is a construct
of the federal securities laws, and does not apply to common law cases. This is a
bit ironic, since the federal courts have utilized the common law in interpreting
section 10(b).
IIl. CHANGING ACADEMIC VIEWS ABOUT THE ECMH
AND ITS USE BY THE SEC
In the mid-1980s, Professors Gilson and Kraakman were able to claim that of "all
recent developments in financial economics, the [ECMH] has achieved the widest
acceptance by the legal culture.... [1]t is addressed by major law school casebooks
and textbooks on business law; it structures debate over the future of securities
regulation both within and without the [SEC] ... and it has even begun to influence
judicial opinions."'87 The central thesis of the ECMH is that the pricing mechanism
for securities traded in the principal public securities markets is efficient in the
84. See, e.g., In re Cyberonics Inc. Sec. Litig., 468 F Supp. 2d 936, 938 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (suit aris-
ing from Cyberonics's efforts to secure approval from the FDA for marketing a device for the treatment
of depression); Noble Asset Mgmt. v. Alios Therapeutics, Inc., No. CIVA-04CV-1030-RPM, 2005 WL
4161977, at *1 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2005) (suit arising from Allos press releases which created a per-
ception in the stock market that the FDA would likely approve a new drug); In re Geopharma, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 399 F Supp. 2d 432, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (claim arising out of press release that caused
investors to believe that the FDA had approved a new Geopharma drug when in fact the FDA had
only approved a much less lucrative medical device); In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
319 F Supp. 2d 152, 155-57 (D. Mass. 2005) (suit based on misleading public statements made by
Transkaryotic regarding the results of FDA clinical tests of a new drug); Anderson v. Abbott Labs., 140
F Supp. 2d 894. 900-01 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd sub nom. Gallagher v. Abbott Labs.- 269 E3d 806 (7th Cir.
2001) (suit arising from Abbott's failure to disclose ongoing compliance issues with FDA regulations);
In re Medimmune, Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F Supp. 953, 956-59 (D. Md. 1995) (action arising out of
statements made by Medimmune regarding the effectiveness of a new drug, FDA review of the drug,
and medical journal articles concerning the drug).
85. See id.
86. See, e.g., Medimmune, 873 F Supp. at 968 (noting that most state courts have rejected "the
fraud-on-the-market concept in connection with common law fraud claims"); Kaufman v. I-Stat Corp.,
754 A.2d 1188, 1200-01 (N.J. 2000); Kahler v. E.F Hutton & Co., Inc., 558 So. 2d 144, 145 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
87. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 549-50.
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sense that the prices fully reflect all available information.8 There are three dif-
ferent ways of interpreting the ECMH-"weak"; "semi-strong"; and "strong." The
"weak" version claims only that historical price movements are irrelevant.89 The
"semi-strong" version claims that publicly released information, such as informa-
tion in SEC filings, is incorporated into stock market prices. 90 The "strong" version
claims that even inside information is so incorporated. 9' Although most observers
accept the "semi-strong" version of the ECMH as describing the relationship be-
tween information and price fluctuations in the public securities markets, this does
not mean that informationally efficient markets always accurately represent the
intrinsic value of securities, because even informationally efficient markets can be
irrational. Similarly, there has long been a debate as to whether and to what extent
informational efficiency contributes to allocation efficiency 92
After the stock market bubble of the 1990s and its inevitable collapse, the
ECMH came under serious criticism. Some critics argued that the ECMH is based
on a model of rational market participants, when in fact many market participants
are not rational and the securities markets are full of "noise" or non-rational trad-
ing strategies that make markets unruly and volatile. 93 Behavioral finance theorists
in a large body of work argue that stock price movements are explained as much
by socio-psychological theories as by economics or finance. 94 Also of importance
to the cases discussed below questioning the Basic presumption of reliance, the
ECMH may not explain the relationship between information and price move-
ments for small issuers or issuers traded in the over-the-counter markets. 95
Whether or not the ECMH is valid, it had a powerful influence on the SEC
in laying a theoretical foundation for the integrated disclosure rules of the early
88. Id. at 554. The ECMH originated with economic theorists. See generally Stephen E LeRoy,
Efficient Capital Markets and Martingales, 27 J. EcoN. LIT. 1583 (1989).
89. Fama, supra note 32, at 388.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market
Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613, 640-58 (1988) (arguing that informational ef-
ficiency has little bearing on the allocation of capital among corporations since corporations rarely rely
on equity issues for funding, and because stock price rarely determines the funds an issuer receives
when issuing stock). For another point of view, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic
Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 734-37 (1984) (outlining the argument
for the necessity of informational efficiency if the securities market is to be the principal allocative
mechanism for investment capital).
93. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 857-71 (1992); Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEwis &
CLARK L. REv. 137, 138-43 (2006).
94. See, e.g., Steven M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REv.
1023, 1033-53 (2000); Lawrence Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 546, 592-607 (1994); Henry
T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REv. 777, 802-07
(2000); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28
J. CoRP. L. 635, 659-66 (2003). The observation that markets are heavily influenced by psychological
factors is of very long standing. See CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS
OF CRowDs (Harriman House 2003) (1841).
95. See Cox ET At., supra note 34, at 109-10.
When Should Investor Reliance be Presumed in Securities Class Actions? 41
1980s. In adopting its integrated disclosure system, the SEC acknowledged that
its de-regulatory policy was premised on the assumptions that "investors are pro-
tected by the market's analysis of information about certain companies which is
widely available.., and that such analysis is reflected in the price of the securities
offered. '96 Therefore, information provided to investors in annual and periodic
reports by seasoned issuers pursuant to applicable provisions of the Exchange Act
did not have to be repeated in registration statements filed by such issuers under
the Securities Act.9 7 The market had already digested this information and it was
reflected in the prices at which securities of these issuers traded. Although efforts to
integrate the disclosure provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act had
been advocated for some time, 98 the ECMH provided a cover for any complaints
that more abbreviated offering disclosure by companies would fail to provide in-
vestors with necessary information. The SEC has continued to believe that the mar-
ket for the securities of well-seasoned, world class companies is informationally
efficient, and its more recent offering reform rules are also based on the ECMH.99
When the SEC adopted its integrated disclosure system, it failed to adjust its filings
review procedures to assure that Exchange Act filings were accurate and complete,
in that staff review continued to be focused on Securities Act registration statements,
and there was no regularized review of Exchange Act annual and periodic reports. 100
This neglect probably led to the large number of subsequent financial restatements,101
which raise a serious question as to whether securities prices of many stocks in the
late 1990s had much relation to their intrinsic market values, even in informationally
efficient markets. In addition to faulty accounting statements by public companies
and other false and misleading statements by issuers, the market for some stocks
may have been influenced by questionable activities of securities research analysts.0 2
Since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC has been forced to
96. Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 33-6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63693, 63698 (proposed Sept. 25, 1980) (to be codified
at 17 C.ER. pts. 230 & 239).
97. Reproposal of Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 33-6331, 46 Fed. Reg. 41902, 41915 (proposed Aug. 18, 1991) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.ER. pt. 239).
98. See Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1342 (1966).
99. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44722,
44727-31 (proposed Aug. 3, 2005) (to be codified in scattered parts of 17 C.ER.). Although this
release does not discuss the ECMH, in making distinctions between well-known seasoned issuers
("WKSI") and other issuers, and permitting WKSIs immediate access to the capital markets, the SEC is
essentially relying on the informational efficiency of the pricing mechanisms for WKSI securities.
100. See JOHN T. BOSTEt.MAN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DESKBOOK § 9:2.2 (Practicing Law Institute 2007).
101. See supra note 83.
102. Former New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer uncovered a scandal among invest-
ment banks whereby research analysts were issuing positive recommendations regarding issuers that
were clients in order to inflate stock prices. See Peter Martin, Who Pays the Piper?: Offering Independent
Analysis Can Be a Delicate Task When Commercial and Investment Interests Hang in the Balance, FIN. TiMEs
(LoNDON), May 20, 2002, at 18 (noting that in 1999 there were eight times as many "buy" recom-
mendations as "sell," and that in 2000, stocks most highly rated by analysts fell 31% while stocks least
favorably rated rose 49%).
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direct its attention to cyclical review of Exchange Act filings."13 In addition, there has
been extensive reform of the practices of research analysts.' °4
The problems of fraud in the securities markets led to a massive increase
in the number of securities class actions in the early years of the 21st century,
as well as to a backlash against plaintiff class action lawyers.10 5 All of these
developments-changing academic theories about the ECMH, extensive fraud in
the securities markets, the problems of handling large and complex securities
class actions-have to some extent impinged upon the use of the Basic presump-
tion of reliance in securities class action cases under Rule lOb-5. These develop-
ments may also require a re-evaluation of Exchange Act civil liability for false and
misleading statements by issuers in SEC filings and similar documents.
IV REBUTTING THE RELIANCE PRESUMPTION
A. THE INEFFICIENT MARKET DEFENSE TO
CLASS CERTIFICATION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has analyzed the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine as creating "a rebuttable presumption that (1) misrepresentations
by an issuer affect the price of securities traded in the open market, and (2) investors
rely on the market price of securities as an accurate measure of their intrinsic
value."' 6 Since this is a rebuttable presumption, the issue of when and with what
type of evidence the presumption can be rebutted has arisen in a number of cases. In
Cammer v. Bloom,'0 7 the court enunciated a five-factor test for determining whether a
market is efficient, as follows: (1) average trading volume; (2) the number of securi-
ties analysts following and reporting on a stock; (3) the presence of market makers
and arbitrageurs (4) a company's eligibility to file a Form S-3; and (5) a cause and
effect relationship between unexpected news and an immediate response in stock
price.'08 In another case, a judge added the company's market capitalization, the
bid-ask spread for stock sales, and the company's public float.' 09 The gist of the
103. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 408, 116 Stat. 745, 790 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 7266 (Supp. IV 2004)) [hereinafter "SOX"].
104. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH. R. 472; NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS R. 2711; Self-Regulatory Organi-
zations; New York Stock Exchange LLC and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice
of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Changes Relating to NYSE Rule 472 and NASD
Rule 2711, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54616, 71 Fed. Reg. 62331 (Oct. 24, 2006).
105. In 2001 approximately 497 securities fraud class actions were filed, more than twice than in
any other year from 1995 to 2000. See Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse,
Index of Filings, http://securities.stanford.edu/companies.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2007). According
to COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 6, at 75-77, although there has been a drop in
the number of securities class action suits in recent years, there has been an extreme rise in the value
of an average settlement.
106. Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 E3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2004).
107. 711 F Supp. 1264 (D.NJ.), appeal dismissed, 993 E2d 875 (3d Cir. 1989) (unpublished table
decision).
108. Id. at 1286-87.
109. Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 1898(SAS),
2006 WL 2161887, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006).
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inquiry is whether the market in a thinly traded security can be considered suf-
ficiently efficient for the presumption to be applied. Also, there have been inquiries
into whether a market in shares of an initial public offering can be efficient for pur-
poses of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine."' 0
The issue of whether reliance can be presumed generally arises in motions to
certify a class in a securities fraud action in federal court, frequently a motion criti-
cal to the outcome of the case since so few securities class actions go to trial.''
In a far-reaching Second Circuit case discussing class certification in a securities
fraud case, the court held that whether the fraud-on-the-market doctrine can be
utilized for a presumption of reliance is an issue that must be resolved on a class
certification motion, and that in making a determination on this issue, a district
court judge needs to resolve factual issues."2 The court also found that the obliga-
tion is not lessened because there may be an overlap between such factual issues
and issues on the merits." 3
One First Circuit decision where the presumption of reliance was rebutted
and the court discussed questions about the efficient market theory was In re
PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation,"4 in which the court adopted a defini-
tion of an efficient market as "one in which the market price of the stock fully
reflects all publicly available information.""' In so doing, the court reversed the
finding of the district court that "market efficiency means that market profes-
sionals generally consider most publicly announced material statements about
companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.""' 6 The circuit court pointed
out that its definition did not mean that the stock price paid or received by
a plaintiff class was correct in the "fundamental value" sense." 7 Rather, the
"fraud-on-the-market theory is concerned with whether a market processes
information in such a way as to justify investor reliance."" 8 In a companion
case to PolyMedica, In re Xcelera.com Securities Litigation,"9 the First Circuit
explained that the test for an efficient market that requires that a stock "fully
reflect" all publicly available information means that the market must "rapidly"
reflect new information.120
The Second Circuit has not yet adopted a definition of an efficient market or
a test for proving or disproving that a market is efficient.' 2' Other circuits that
have addressed the issue are generally in accord with the First Circuit's opinion
110. In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 471 E3d 24, 33 (2d Cir. 2006).
111. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 E3d 935,937 (7th Cir. 2002). In this case, the court refused
to apply the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to statements purporting to convey inside information. Id.
112. Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 471 E3d at 33.
113. Id.
114. 432 F3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
115. Id. at 14.
116. Id. at 19.
117. Id. at 14-16.
118. Id. at 16.
119. 430 E3d 503 (1st Cir. 2005).
120. See id. at 508.
121. See Teamsters Local 445, 2006 WL 2161887, at *5.
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in PolyMedica,12 although the Third Circuit seems to be more in accord with the
PolyMedica district court judge in finding that an efficient market is one in which
information important to reasonable investors is incorporated into stock market
prices.123 Also, in a case in the Southern District of New York, Judge Scheindlin
seemed to take issue with the First Circuit's interpretation of Basic, siding with
the PolyMedica district court judge in saying that as defined in Basic an efficient
market is one in which "market professionals generally consider most publicly
announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market
prices. Nevertheless, she acknowledged that other circuits had also adopted
the First Circuit's broader definition. 125
In Xcelera.com the First Circuit held that the district court properly applied the
Cammer factors to find that the market in Xcelera stock was efficient. 126 In the
remand of PolyMedica, the district court held that the market in PolyMedica stock
was not efficient.12 7 One of the important holdings of the case was that in order to
find that the market for a stock is efficient, the market must react to news on the
same trading day as its release. 128 In Teamsters Local 445, the court also held that
the market in certificates issued by Bombardier was not efficient and therefore
class certification was denied.'29 In all of these cases a mini trial based on a battle
of experts was held. 3 °
The Second Circuit has held that the market for IPO stocks is not efficient and
therefore the fraud-on-the-market doctrine cannot be used to raise a presumption
of reliance. 3' This case involved a motion for class certification in six securi-
ties fraud actions selected as "focus cases" out of 310 consolidated class actions
claiming fraud against underwriters, issuers, and various individuals in connec-
tion with three fraudulent practices. 3 2 These were (1) allocating IPO shares on
the condition that purchasers would purchase additional shares in the aftermar-
ket; (2) the payment of undisclosed compensation to underwriters; and (3) the
improper use of analysts in IPOs by underwriters. 33 Citing with approval a Sixth
Circuit case holding that the primary market for newly issued securities is not ef-
ficient, the court held that the market for IPO shares is not efficient, and therefore
122. See Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 E3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004); Greenberg v. Crossroads
Sys., Inc., 364 E3d 657,662 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F2d 193,198 (6th
Cir. 1990); No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. West Holding Corp.,
320 F3d 920,947 (9th Cir.) (Tallman,j., dissenting), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 966 (2003);Joseph v. Wiles,
223 F3d 1155, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000); Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F3d 1271, 1276 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
123. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997).
124. See Teamsters Local 445, 2006 WL 2161887, at *6.
125. Id.
126. Xcelera.com, 403 F3d at 516.
127. In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F Supp. 2d 260, 278 (D. Mass. 2006).
128. Id.
129. Teamsters Local 445, 2006 WL 2161887, at *12.
130. See Xcelera.com, 430 F3d at 512; Polymedica, 453 F Supp. 2d at 266, 269; Teamsters Local 445,
2006 WL 2161887, at *9.
131. Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F3d at 42-43.
132. Id. at 27.
133. Id.
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no presumption of reliance could be accorded to the plaintiffs and their motion
for class certification failed. 3 4 Among other things, the court noted that analysts
are not allowed to report on IPO securities for 25 days after an offering.' 35
B. THE RESEARCH ANALYSTS CASES
In December 2002, the New York Attorney General, the SEC, and other regula-
tors reached a "global settlement" in their investigation into the investment banking
practices of ten major Wall Street investment banking houses. t3 6 One of the pri-
mary allegations in these cases was that Wall Street securities analysts issued overly
optimistic research reports in order to foster investment banking relationships
between issuers and the firms at which the analysts were employed. 137 As a result
of these charges, thousands of arbitration proceedings and hundreds of securities
class actions were filed alleging that analyst conflicts of interest resulted in fraud on
broker-dealer customers. 38 Few of these cases succeeded because it was very dif-
ficult for plaintiffs to allege and prove the necessary elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim.
One of the issues on which some of the cases floundered was reliance. Other cases
were dismissed because of a failure to allege sufficiently loss causation.
At the initial stages of some cases, motions to dismiss were made on the ground
that the fraud-on-the-market doctrine applies only to misrepresentations by cor-
porate insiders, not to opinions by securities research analysts. This argument
was rejected on the ground that the fraud-on-the-market doctrine has no such
limitation and since prices in an open market reflect supply and demand, defen-
dants cannot defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground that that their published
purchase recommendations did not affect purchasers of stock and therefore stock
prices. 139 Similarly, in another case, the court held that applying the Basic pre-
sumption in the analyst context is a logical extension of the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine because analyst reports are written "with the purpose and expectation
that the market will take heed of their message. The efficient market hypothesis
suggests that all relevant information-which... includes analysts reports.., is
immediately impacted into stock prices." 1
40
134. Id. at 42-45 (citing Freeman, 915 E2d at 199).
135. Id. at 43. Ironically, a similar requirement was imposed by rule after the research analysts
cases, brought by the New York Attorney General and then followed up upon by the SEC, upon which
this private lawsuit was based. See Stephen J. Hilgers, Under the Influence: Analyzing Wall Street Research
Analyst Conflicts of Interest and the Responses Designed To Induce Impartiality, 31 SEC. REG. L.J. 427, 475
(2003) [hereinafter "Hilgers, Under the Influence"].
136. See Press Release, Office of the New York Attorney General, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD,
NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement To Reform Investment Practices:
$1.4 Billion Global Settlement Includes Penalties and Funds for Investors (Dec. 20, 2002), http://
www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/dec/dec20b_02.html.
137. See id.
138. See generally Hilgers, Under the Influence, supra note 135.
139. See DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens Inc., 318 F Supp. 2d 110, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); DeMarco v.
Lehman Bros., Inc., 309 E Supp. 2d 631,636 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). See also Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc., 396 F3d 161, 172 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 421 (2005). But see In re Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc., 273 F Supp. 2d 351, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss a class action
in holding that the allegedly fraudulent research reports were not a "fraud upon the market").
140. In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 465 F Supp. 2d 34, 52-53 (D. Mass. 2006).
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In the context of class certification, however, motions to dismiss have succeeded
because courts have required a showing that analyst reports "materially and mea-
surably impacted the market price of the security to which the [false or fraudulent]
statements relate."' 14 Further, a motion to certify a class was granted interlocutory
review by the Second Circuit as a "novel question" but the case was settled before
the Second Circuit was able to speak on the issue.142 Nevertheless, the court ex-
pressed the view that only where publication of an analyst's report "clearly moved
the market in a measurable fashion would the 'fraud on the market' doctrine seem
fairly applicable."'4 3 Further, in a subsequent case also involving this issue, the
Second Circuit held that a district court must resolve factual issues in deciding a
class certification motion, 144 suggesting that a research analyst's opinion cannot be
presumed to have automatic impact on the price of a security because such state-
ments are subjective and uncertain, unlike statements emanating from an issuer
which are "relatively fixed, certain, and uncontradicted."
14 5
Some other cases in which the plaintiffs alleged fraud based on the conflicts
between research analysts and investment bankers were dismissed on the ground
that loss causation was not sufficiently alleged. In Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc. 4' the Second Circuit held that satisfying the proximate cause element in tort
law was insufficient to establish loss causation in a securities case after Dura, and
that in order to establish loss causation, a plaintiff must allege "that the misstate-
ment or omission concealed something from the market that, when disclosed,
negatively affected the value of the security " 47 In subsequent district court cases,
involving the research analyst conflict of interest scenario, the courts have dis-
missed complaints alleging that analyst reports were not the true opinions of the
analysts when made on the ground that the relevant truth about these reports
was not disclosed, if ever, until years after plaintiffs' losses were realized." 48
Research reports are generally directed to customers of a broker-dealer. The
research analysts cases could have been decided on the ground that since analysts,
unlike issuers, do not have a general duty to the marketplace,' 49 the reliance re-
quirement of Rule lOb-5 is not met unless a plaintiff can allege actual reliance on
a research analyst report in purchasing or selling a security Alternatively, where
an investor did not receive or review an analyst report, 5 ° there is a question of
whether reliance was justifiable, and therefore a presumption of reliance seems
inappropriate. Where there is no evidence that a research report directly affected
141. DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 222 ER.D. 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
142. Hevesi, 366 E3d at 81.
143. Id. at 80 n.7 (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., Security Analyst Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 20,
2001, at 5).
144. Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 471 E3d at 33.
145. Demarco v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 222 ER.D. at 246.
146. Lentell, 396 E3d 161.
147. Id. at 173.
148. Joffee v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 410 F Supp. 2d 187, 193 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd, 209 E App'x 80 (2d
Cir. 2006).
149. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980)-
150. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 273 E Supp. 2d at 388-89.
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,the price of a security, not only is there a failure of proof of causation, but it would
seem anomalous to employ the fraud-on-the market doctrine to establish reliance.
If research reports do not affect securities prices, the viability of the ECMH would
seem to be undermined, and the viability of the fraud-on-the-market presump-
tion would seem to be weakened.
C. OTHER SECONDARY ACTOR CASES
In Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., ' 5 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that aiding and abetting is not a basis for civil liability under Rule 10b-5. Sub-
sequently, Congress amended the Exchange Act to provide for aiding and abetting
liability in cases brought by the SEC, but not by private parties.1 2 Plaintiffs have
nevertheless pursued secondary actors in cases in which third parties have en-
gaged in transactions with an issuer which resulted in false or fraudulent financial
statements by the issuer. In some cases, the courts have held such third parties
liable as "primary violators" and in other cases, the courts have declined to do so.
These different results stem from the somewhat ambiguous dicta in the majority
opinion in Central Bank that secondary actors are not always free from liability:
"[a]ny person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a
purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under
lOb-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5
are met."" 3
In Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 5 4 the court held that in order for an accoun-
tant's misrepresentation to be actionable, the accountant must make a false or
misleading public statement. 51 In addition, the court held that the requirement
that the accountant made a public statement was also necessary in order to raise
the presumption of reliance in a securities class action under the fraud-on-the-
market theory.
156
In Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc.,"' the court held that "conduct by a defen-
dant that had the principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance in
deceptive transactions as part of a scheme to defraud is conduct that uses or em-
ploys a deceptive device within the meaning of § 10(b)."'158 Further, the court held
that a plaintiff could utilize the presumption of reliance in such a case "if a mis-
representation, which necessarily resulted from the scheme and the defendant's
conduct therein, was disseminated into an efficient market and was reflected in
151. 511 U.S. 164, 175-77 (1994).
152. Exchange Act, supra note 1, § 20, 48 Stat. at 899 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t
(2000)).
153. 511 U.S. at 191.
154. 368 F3d 356 (4th Cir. 2004).
155. Id. at 369. Accord Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1104 (1999).
156. Gariety, 368 E3d at 369..
157. 452 E3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006).
158. Id. at 1052.
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the market price." '159 Similarly, some district courts which have allowed scheme
liability under Rule 10b-5 have taken the position that reliance on a misstate-
ment by a secondary actor is not required under Rule 1Ob-5(a) and (c); rather,
where banks engaged in transactions with an issuer knowing that the purpose of
the transactions was to allow the issuer to make misrepresentations, the conduct
of the banks was a significant contributing cause of the plaintiffs injury and this
satisfied the reliance requirement. 160 This reasoning, however, seems to confuse
reliance and transaction causation.
By contrast, in In re Charter Communications, Inc., Securities Litigation16 ' and Re-
gents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc.'62 the
Eighth and Fifth Circuits determined that the inclusion of secondary actors who
assisted an issuer in a transaction which resulted in an accounting misstatement
were at most guilty of aiding and abetting and could not be held liable under
section 10(b). The issue in these cases was whether plaintiffs can be presumed to
have relied on activities of third parties, such as investment banks who entered
into allegedly fraudulent accounting transactions with an issuer, in situations
where plaintiffs had no knowledge of what such third parties were doing or who
they were. In a brief filed in the Fifth Circuit case against Credit Suisse and other
banks by a group of state attorneys general, the argument was made that inves-
tors can presume that all actors in a securities market are behaving legally163 But
this is a somewhat circular argument because if these third parties had no duty
to the plaintiffs under Rule lOb-5, their conduct was not necessarily illegal. The
Fifth Circuit took the position that the bank's actions were not "misrepresenta-
tions" on which an efficient market may be presumed to rely, nor were they stock
manipulation activities.'64 The district court had viewed the transactions by the
banks as "deceptive devices" under Rule lOb-5, but the Fifth Circuit held that
without plaintiffs proving that "they individually relied on the banks' omissions,"
the banks could not be guilty of engaging in a deceptive device unless the transac-
tions in which they engaged involved breach of some duty of disclosure. 165 This case
came to the court on a motion for certification of a class. The court's view was that
the plaintiffs had no expectation that the banks would provide them with informa-
tion, and therefore they were not relying on the bank's candor. 166 This interpretation
of Rule lOb-5 is similar to the interpretation of the Supreme Court in Chiarella v.
United States in which the court held that a duty to disclose to a purchaser or seller
of securities is required in order for an omission to violate section 10(b).'67
159. Id.
160. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 E Supp. 2d 472, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). See also In re Lemout &
Hauspie Sec. Litig., 236 E Supp. 2d 161, 173-74 (D. Mass. 2003).
161. 443 F3d 987, 991-93 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted sub noa. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1973 (2007).
162. 482 E3d 372, 390 (5th Cir. 2007), petitionfor cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W 3557 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2007)
(No. 06-1341).
163. See State AGs Contend Enron Suit Properly Certified as Class Action, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
102 (Jan. 22, 2007).
164. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 482 E3d at 390-92.
165. Id. at 385.
166. Id.
167. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229.
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V. A REVISIONIST VIEW OF THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET DOCTRINE
Let me begin this part with a personal anecdote. A number of years ago I had
the honor of being introduced to Justice Blackman, the author of the Basic Inc. v.
Levinson opinion, as a "securities law guru." He immediately asked me, "What did
you think of my decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson? Many people think it's wrong."
I told him my honest opinion which was that it seemed to me to be a sound de-
cision, and I did not think informational efficiency was the same as other types
of market efficiencies, as argued by the dissent. My positive reaction was partly
based on my understanding that the SEC had utilized the ECMH in some of its
most important rule making in integrating the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act in the early 1980s, an initiative that began when I was an SEC Commissioner.
This integration was predicated on the assumption that the securities markets are
generally informationally efficient, and that information disclosed in a corpora-
tion's annual reports and other filings becomes incorporated into the price of a
company's securities. Therefore, it is not necessary for an issuer to repeat prior
disclosures in an Exchange Act filing that it made in a Securities Act registration
statement. But if issuers are not in compliance with their disclosure obligations
because they have issued false or misleading statements, the market for their stock
does not have the integrity reasonably expected by investors who are entitled to
assume that companies are in compliance with SEC requirements.
More recent academic skepticism about the ECMH, the cases involving inef-
ficient markets, including IPO markets, and the cases involving research analysts
and other third parties would seem to require a rethinking of the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine to establish reliance. It is illogical and bad policy for investors to
be able to hold seasoned issuers to the statements they make or fail to make in
SEC filings and similar documents, but not to be able to sue unseasoned issuers
for fraud in the statements they make in SEC filings or other deliberate utterances.
Why should investors not be able to rely upon the truth of statements by issuers,
and why should such statements not be presumed to be reflected in securities
prices if they are material? Yet, extending the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to
statements by third parties, who are not required to speak by SEC regulations
and do not owe a duty to investors or shareholders, seems to encourage too much
questionable litigation.
68
The heart of this conundrum is that section 18 of the Exchange Act is useless
as a civil remedy It has essentially been read out of the statute and replaced by
suits under Rule 10b-5, which have been developed by the courts in a common
168. It has long been the law that when a broker-dealer makes a recommendation to buy or sell a
security, the recommendation must have a reasonable basis. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F2d 589, 597 (2d Cir.
1969). But this law developed under the shingle theory to protect broker-dealers' customers from
overreaching, not to protect all investors in the public securities markets from unwarranted recom-
mendations. While the advent of the star research analyst who regularly appears on television to tout
stocks may have magnified the effect of analyst recommendations on stock market prices, these recom-
mendations seem to be just part of the general "noise" in the public securities markets. However, the
SEC and banking regulators should be able to sanction banks that engage in questionable financial
transactions designed to falsify issuer financial statements, and accountants who improperly fail to
uncover, or even assist, such fraud.
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law fashion. By contrast, the comparable civil liability provisions in the Securities
Act, which provide for civil liability for false and misleading statements in offering
documents, were more carefully crafted, and have provided a balance between
imposing liability on issuers and insiders, and their accountants and bankers, in
appropriate situations, and guarding against excessive litigation.'69 Section 1 1(a) of
the Securities Act provides a civil action, essentially for rescission, to purchasers of
securities pursuant to a registration statement that, when declared effective by the
SEC, "contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading." 7 Such an action may be brought against signers of the registration
statement, directors, consenting accountants and other experts, and "every under-
writer with respect to such security"' 7 But this imposition of liability on directors
and underwriters is not absolute. They are given two defenses in section 11(b) of
the Securities Act. First, with regard to any part of the registration statement that
is "expertised," a director or underwriter can prove that "he had no reasonable
ground to believe and did not believe, at the time such part of the registration state-
ment became effective, that the statements therein were untrue or that there was an
omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading .... ,,i72 Financial statements certified by a
consenting accountant are "expertised" for purposes of this provision. 7 3 However,
an accountant's report on unaudited interim financial statements is not an "exper-
tised" report.'74 Second, with respect to any part of the registration statement not
made on the authority of an expert, a director or underwriter can prove that he
or she had "after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did
believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that
the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading."'75 This is commonly called the "due diligence defense."
There are not many courts interpreting these statutory provisions and rules and
suggesting that section 11 of the Securities Act is a better formulation for civil li-
ability than either section 18 or section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, particularly
since the cases that have been decided have had far-reaching effects on the conduct of
IPOs.' 76 The Securities Act also contains express civil liability provisions in section 12,
169. Securities Act, supra note 3, § 11(a), 48 Stat. at 82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)
(2000)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Securities Act, supra note 3, § Il(b)(3)(C), 48 Stat. at 82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b)(3)(C) (2000)).
173. See id.
174. Rule 436, 17 C.ER. § 230.436 (2007).
175. Securities Act, supra note 3, § 1 l(b)(3)(A), 48 Stat. at 82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b)(3)(A) (2000)).
176. Whether the added costs of due diligence are worth the benefits of more efficient allocation of
resources in raising capital is a question for another article. See Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsi-
dies, Efficient Markets and Shef Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REv. 135, 145-84 (1984);
Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE LJ. 977, 1005-42
(1992). The cases that exist can be divided into three rough groups: (1) the classic cases in which
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but these provisions apply only to sellers in public offerings.'77 Since section 18 of the
Exchange Act seems to have been crafted and interpreted to eliminate any likelihood of
civil liability for issuers and insiders who commit fraud in their SEC filings, and Rule
10b-5 has led to a litigation explosion that some now claim is threatening the competi-
tiveness of the United States capital markets,1 18 a sensible re-articulation of Exchange
Act liability by the courts, the Congress, or the SEC would seem to be in order. When
an issuer is conducting an IPO, there is less of a policy need to balance the interests of
shareholders against the interests of investors since the companys shareholders are pri-
marily insiders. Further, the production of a prospectus in an IPO is a more deliberative
process than ongoing disclosure. In secondary offerings, involving the integrated dis-
closure regime, there is a greater need to balance competing shareholder and investor
interests, although both types of offerings can give rise to liability under section 11.
Reliance is presumed in section 11 cases until an earnings statement which cov-
ers a period of at least twelve months after the effective date of the registration state-
ment becomes available. 17 9 In a recent circuit court case, the presumption of reliance
was held not available where the purchasers made their investment decision before
a defective registration statement was issued.1 80 The court noted that the reason
Congress drafted section 11 to provide for a presumption of reliance is that, even if
a purchaser may not read and rely on the registration statement, any misstatements
or omissions can be "reasonably assumed to affect the market price and impel the
purchase."'' Although this logic is somewhat at odds with the holding of the Sec-
ond Circuit that IPO markets are not efficient for purposes of a presumption of reli-
ance under section 10(b)(5),' 82 the Second Circuit case did not involve issuer fraud,
but rather wrongdoing by underwriters. Despite flaws in the ECMH, it seems more
realistic to argue that issuer statements affect the pricing of an issuer's securities, so
that reliance on such statements can be presumed, than to argue that statements or
actions by third parties directly and necessarily affect the pricing of securities.
The ALI Federal Securities Code, which would have achieved integration of
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act by going to a system of company regis-
courts discuss underwriter liability prior to integrated disclosure, especially Escott v. BarChris Construc-
tion Corp., 283 F Supp. 643,692-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.,
332 F Supp. 544, 581-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); (2) more recent cases in which courts find, on motions for
summary judgment, that underwriters have fulfilled their due diligence responsibilities, especially In re
Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, 35 F3d 1407, 1414-21 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Millerv.
Pezzani, 516 U.S. 868 (1995), and In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Securities Litigation, (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied sub nom. Montgomery Securities v. Dannenberg, 516 U.S. 907 (1995); and (3) the post-2000
cases, following the bursting of the technology bubble in which courts again set high standards for
due diligence, especially In re Enron Corp. Securities Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F Supp. 2d 549,
596-613 (S.D. Tex. 2002), and In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities litigation, 346 E Supp. 2d 628, 656-59,
678-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
177. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 583 (1995).
178. See REGULATIoN OF CAPITAL MARKtErs, supra note 6, at 5; BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 6, at
101.
179. See Securities Act, supra note 3, § 11(a), 48 Stat. at 82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a) (2000)).
180. APA Excelsior Ill L.T v. Premiere Techs., Inc., 476 E3d 1261, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2007).
181. Id. at 1274.
182. See In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F3d 24, 42-43 (2d Cir. 2006).
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tration," 3 attempted to revise the civil liability provisions of the two statutes by:
(1) imposing section 11 type liability on issuers, and an issuer's principal execu-
tive officers and directors, consenting named persons, and consenting directors
and underwriters for fraud in registration statements, documents incorporated by
reference in registration statements, and an issuer's annual report on Form 10K
filed with the SEC; and (2) imposing Rule 10b-5 type liability on issuers, agents,
aiders and abettors, and controlling persons for fraud in all other reports to secu-
rity holders.18 4 The basic difference between these two sections had to do with the
burden and standard of proof and the persons liable. While time has passed the
Federal Securities Code by, the notion that integrated disclosure should lead to an
integration of the civil liability provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act for fraud in documents filed with the SEC remains sound.
A further current anomaly in the imposition of liability under Rule lOb-5 is that
the SEC is not required to prove reliance in an enforcement action for anti-fraud
violations because the reliance requirement is not contained in section 10(b), but
rather has been developed by the courts in private implied actions.18 5 Yet, the SEC
can use civil monetary penalties and enforcement settlements to establish a "FAIR"
Fund for the benefit of victims of securities law violations. 186 This remedy dates
back only to 2002, but by April 2005 the SEC had authorized FAIR Funds in over
100 cases with a total value of $5.2 billion.187 Although the SEC has expressed
the view that private litigation is a better mechanism than SEC enforcement for
investor recovery of losses,'88 if class actions for issuer fraud in filed documents
and similar communications are curtailed because markets are inefficient or in-
vestors are unable to otherwise prove that they relied upon false statements, SEC
enforcement actions may become a preferable route to recover losses for investors.
Further, there is a serious question as to whether private securities litigation should
be able to proceed side by side with SEC actions establishing FAIR Funds. 9
While the fraud-on-the-market doctrine may have outlived its utility, its rejec-
tion by the courts should not lead to the regulatory result that shareholders and
investors cannot rely upon the truth of an issuer's statements in SEC filings and
similar documents. The SEC's mandatory disclosure system depends upon fair
and accurate financial disclosure by issuers. They should not be let off the hook
because the market for their securities is inefficient. It may be inefficient, in part,
because of their poor disclosures.
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Whether research analysts should be held liable to investors generally for state-
ments in their reports to the same extent as issuers is another question, as imposing
general fraud liability upon them could unduly chill analysts' insights and recom-
mendations. Further, investor reliance on such reports seems more tenuous than
investor reliance on SEC mandated disclosure by issuers. This does not mean that
analysts should not be held accountable for errant behavior, but as persons associ-
ated with broker-dealers, there are other mechanisms, such as disciplinary proceed-
ings, to hold them accountable. Similarly, banks can be sued as aiders and abettors
by the SEC. Further, where research reports are transmitted to a customer, or banks
engage in questionable transactions, the liability regime should be different from
class action suits that include customers who never saw or read such research re-
ports or relied on the banks which engaged in questionable transactions.
If the antipathy developing against plaintiff class action suits becomes suffi-
ciently robust, it is likely that the courts will whittle away at Rule lob-5 cases, and
among other tools, question the presumption of reliance based on the ECMH. But
a more global solution would be preferable, in which investors could hold issuers
to their statements made in Exchange Act reports, in much the same fashion that
section 11, of the Securities Act operates to hold issuers and others responsible
for statements made in registration statements. Unfortunately, such a solution
would seem to require congressional action and Congress has been notoriously
irresponsible in attending to the problems engendered by the development of
Rule lob-5 litigation in a common law type of fashion. Instead of remedying the
defects of section 18 of the Exchange Act, Congress has enlarged the scope of
Exchange Act remedies when such an enlargement seemed popular in response
to scandals, and restricted the scope of Exchange Act remedies at other times,
without specifying the elements of a Rule lob-5 action, the appropriate measure
of damages, or who are the proper plaintiffs and proper defendants in such cases.
One can always hope that future Congresses will be more attentive to such mat-
ters, but in the meantime, the courts and the SEC will have to attempt to reconcile
the contradictory cases in this area of the law.'90
One solution, recommended by me, is to apply the presumption of reliance
narrowly to false or misleading statements in filed documents made by issuers on
the theory that investors should be able to reasonably expect that issuers comply
with their disclosure requirements in a' truthful fashion and that such statements
affect securities prices. Whether officers and directors should be similarly liable is
a more complicated question. Since the CEO and CFO are now required to certify
an issuer's financial statements, it would not seem a leap to hold them to simi-
lar liability Directors perhaps should have defenses similar to the due diligence
and reliance on experts defenses of section 11 of the Securities Act, but under
Rule lob-5 this notion probably becomes subsumed by the scienter requirement.
Whether accountants should be liable to investors for false financial statements in
190. The latest example of how Congress deals with these problems is that Barney Frank, now the
Democratic Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, is pressuring the SEC to file a brief
on behalf of the plaintiffs in the Credit Suisse case, but the plaintiffs are represented by William Lerach
who may be indicted for improper behavior in class action lawsuits. See Kara Scannell, SEC's Allegiances
Are Put to Test, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2007, at A2. Furthermore, at least one of the institutional investors,
54 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 63, November 2007
SEC filed documents is a complicated issue, which would deserve serious atten-
tion in any redrafting of the civil liability provisions of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act. In the absence of any such legislation, accountants are generally
only aiders and abettors who escape liability under Central Bank.
With regard to issuer statements not contained in filed documents, or state-
ments by third parties, however, it would seem that plaintiffs should not be en-
titled to utilize the presumption of reliance in order to certify a class action, at
least in omission cases. Rather, they should be required to prove that any false
or misleading statements defied reasonable investor expectations and actually af-
fected the price of the issuer's securities. Such a formulation, after Dura, would be
consistent with the reasoning of the Second Circuit's decision that district courts
need to resolve relevant factual issues before approving a class in a certification
motion.' 9' Further, it is hard to see how certifications by accountants are not
considered statements to investors under Central Bank, but transactions by third
parties could so qualify. Although reform of the reliance requirement could be
initiated by the courts, it would be better for a comprehensive redrafting of Ex-
change Act civil liability to be accomplished through legislation.
Such legislation should integrate the liability provisions of the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act in the context of modern securities markets, and place the
onus for any liability on issuers and their CEOs and CFOs, without unduly favor-
ing investors over shareholders. It should be noted that in today's institutional
markets, many pension and other funds are both investors in a plaintiff class
and shareholders of the defendant issuer in a securities class action. This does
not make much sense except for the plaintiff's and defendant's lawyers enjoying
the fees from such litigation. These transaction costs could be diminished if the
parameters of section 10(b) claims were less open to changing judicial interpreta-
tions. Although a common law method generally is a useful tool for articulating fi-
duciary responsibilities, in the case of securities class actions under section 10(b),
courts have run amuck by certifying enormous classes utilizing a presumption of
reliance based on the ECMH theory in which many no longer believe.
In my view, in an appropriate case, the Court could discard the fraud-on-the-
market theory, but a fat-out rejection of Basic would have unfortunate implica-
tions for the SEC's disclosure regime. In order for the SEC's integrated disclosure
system to function, issuers need to be held accountable if their statements in SEC
filed documents are not truthful. Private damage actions have a role as such an
accountability mechanism, but they need to be kept within bounds so that they
do not impair capital formation and the vitality of the public securities markets.
The reliance requirement has been a mechanism for greatly expanding the types
of cases qualifying as securities class actions, and a readjustment of the reliance
requirement could be utilized to narrow the scope of these cases. Yet, such a
readjustment should be targeted, and not completely gut section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 as an accountability device for issuer fraud.
California Public Employees' Retirement System, lost money in Enron's stock investing in off balance
sheet Enron deals, in some respects similar to the deals at issue in this case. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr.,
Employees' Retirement Plan Is a Victim as Enron Tumbles, N.Y. TimES, Nov. 23, 2001, at Al.
191. Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 471 E3d at 33.
